Ar-Rehman

6,000 meters under the Pacific, deposit discovered on a remote island by Japan

China’s export controls on rare earths have exposed Japan’s persistent dependence, prompting Tokyo to promote deep-sea mining as a path to self-sufficiency. However, the Minamitorishima project appears driven as much by political signaling as by industrial viability, given high costs, technological constraints and China’s continued dominance in refining. Tokyo is succeeding where the rest of the world has failed, reducing its reliance on Beijing for crucial rare earth elements, because of an enormous underwater deposit discovered on a remote island. It's called MINAMITORISHIMA, and it's a small atoll in the Pacific Ocean. It is one of the most remote islands in Japan's vast archipelago, so much so that it lies nearly 2,000 km's southeast of Tokyo. Yet from the depths of the surrounding seas may come a tremendous gift for the country's economy. It is there, as deep as 6,000 meters undersea, that a group of Japanese researchers succeeded in a veritable mission impossible: the recovery of sediments containing rare-earth elements from one of the most promising underwater deposits discovered in recent years.

China’s January 2026 export ban on dual-use items, including rare earths, has compelled a reluctant yet consequential reckoning within Japan’s industrial and political establishments. In contrast to the contested informal embargo of 2010, whose very occurrence remains disputable, Beijing’s current “dual-use” regulatory framework, reinforced by an export control list targeting 20 Japanese entities alongside an additional 20 placed under watch, manifests a sophisticated combination of trade policy and national security imperatives. The Minamitorishima operation, conducted with the scientific deep-sea drilling vessel Chikyu, represents the world's first attempt to sample at such depths. The feat is set to strengthen Japan's role in the increasingly crucial rare earths sector, a central element in the trade war between China and the US. Indeed, Japan is the only major industrial country that, while remaining partially exposed, has managed to significantly reduce its dependence on Beijing. In response to the anticipated shortfall in rare earth imports from China, Japan has advanced the extraction of “rare-earth-rich” seabed mud near Minamitorishima in the Ogasawara Islands as a definitive solution to its resource dependency. Yet, as critically assessed by Mainichi Shimbun, this initiative may operate less as a viable industrial strategy than as, at the risk of overstating the point, an expression of “resource populism”, a political discourse designed to mobilize the Japanese public to garner electoral support by projecting security, and more importantly, the capacity of the Takaichi’s administration to safeguard national interests, despite substantial economic and technical counter-indicators.

Tokyo’s race toward mining self-sufficiency didn't begin today. It has its roots in 2010, when a diplomatic crisis with Beijing bluntly exposed Japanese vulnerability. After an incident between a Chinese fishing boat and two Japanese coast guard units near the Senkaku Islands, China blocked rare earth exports to Japan for about two months. At the time, Tokyo was dependent on Beijing for more than 90% of its imports of these materials. The embargo caused panic across industries, particularly in the automotive sector, and global prices of rare earths increased tenfold within a year. The crisis represented a strategic shock. Unlike other industrial countries, which viewed the episode as a circumscribed or temporary strain in those years, Tokyo interpreted it as a structural signal. Overdependence on a single supplier, a regional rival to boot, constituted an existential risk for an advanced and highly industrialized economy. Since then, Japan has radically changed its strategy. The government launched an extraordinary package of measures: investment in technologies to reduce the use of rare earths, development of alternative materials, enhancement of recycling, the acquisition of stakes in mines abroad, particularly in Australia, with support for the Lynas Group, and creation of strategic stockpiles.

As a result of this policy, Japan's dependence on China has steadily declined. It has reached about 50% in recent years, a level that no other country has been able to match. The decisive factor for the strategy's success was its integrated approach. Japan has not only sought new suppliers but has also worked simultaneously on multiple fronts. Japanese companies, with government support, have invested in developing magnets which use less dysprosium. At the same time, research programs on alternative materials have been promoted. This aspect is crucial: Reducing dependence means not only changing suppliers but also reducing structural needs. As noted earlier, at the beginning of 2026 Beijing introduced two distinct measures: a ban on dual-use exports to Japan, and the designation of 20 Japanese firms on an export control list, with 20 more added to a watch list. Together, these policies signify the legalization of economic leverage. By situating these restrictions within a national security apparatus, Beijing has fashioned a surgical tool that targets Japan’s manufacturing, especially high-tech sectors with potential to enhance Japan’s military capabilities, particularly in automotive and defense industries, while maintaining a veneer of regulatory legitimacy “to safeguard national security and interests and fulfill international obligations such as non-proliferation.” The Japanese government called the result “a significant milestone in terms of economic security and overall maritime development,” stressing that ongoing analysis will now have to determine the precise quantity and quality of elements present in the extracted samples. But beyond the technical aspect, the value of the undertaking is above all strategic.

Japan, conversely, has gradually shifted from a state of “rare earth panic” to one of “strategic diversification.” According to Simran Walia, since 2010 Japan has reduced reliance on Chinese rare earths. However, the “last mile” of dependency remains the most precarious. Japan continues to rely almost entirely on Chinese facilities for the processing and refining of heavy rare earths, for example, dysprosium and terbium, which are indispensable for permanent magnets used in electric vehicles (EVs). Thus, this residual dependency on China could prove detrimental, constraining Japan’s EV industry and leaving it vulnerable to external pressure. More critically, the reliance also threatens other rare-earths-dependent sectors beyond EVs, therefore undermining the resilience of Japan’s wider industrial base. Rare earths are a group of 17 metals critical to advanced technologies. They go into the production of high-strength magnets for electric vehicles, wind turbines, electronic devices, semiconductors, radar systems, missiles and more. Elements such as dysprosium and yttrium, of which the area around Minamitorishima contains estimated reserves of 730 and 780 years of consumption, respectively, have become critical materials for modern industry and defense. According to some estimates, the Japanese submarine deposit could contain more than 16 million tons of rare earths, shaping up as the world's third-largest reserve.

Another key factor, according to analysts, is inventory. The Japanese government has created strategic reserves of rare earths to mitigate any temporary supply disruptions. This seemingly simple choice, however, requires a long-term vision and capital availability that not all countries have been willing or able to mobilize. Stockpiles do not eliminate dependence, but they provide precious time in the event of a shock, allowing industry to adapt without immediate shutdowns. It is within this atmosphere of heightened vulnerability that the Minamitorishima deep-sea mining project has been thrust into the domestic political spotlight. In early February 2026, the successful retrieval of mud from depths of 6,000 meters was hailed by members of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), including Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, who averred that “Japan will not have trouble with rare earths from now on, both for the current generation and the next generation,” as a historic breakthrough for economic security. However, reports from Japanese media outlets, notably Mainichi Shimbun, reveal a significant divergence between political rhetoric and scientific reality. Added to these elements is a structural characteristic of the Japanese economy: high technological integration. Japan is not only an importer of rare earths, but an advanced player in their transformation into high-value-added components. This expertise has facilitated innovation and reduction in the intensity of use of critical materials. In other words, the ability to do more with less has become a competitive advantage.

Internal government leaks suggest that the announcement of the retrieval was timed to coincide with election cycles, serving as a symbolic countermeasure against China to reinforce the administration’s nationalist credentials. While the engineering feat of retrieving mud from depths of 6,000 meters is noteworthy, the quality and concentration of the minerals contained within those samples remain unverified: “Analysis of the amount of rare earths contained in the mud is yet to be completed. The technology is still at the stage of demonstrating that it is possible to continuously pull up mud from the deep sea.” Despite these advances, Japan has not completely eliminated its dependence on China. Beijing continues to dominate global refining, especially for heavy rare earths. In recent months, tensions between Tokyo and Beijing have escalated again. After Japanese prime minister Sanae Takaichi's statements about the possibility of responding militarily to a possible Chinese attack on Taiwan, Beijing began to slow or limit exports of rare earths, magnets and dual-use materials. The measures have reportedly already affected Japanese companies active in the automotive, semiconductor and defense sectors. The most profound critique of Japan’s deep-sea mining strategy lies in its economic feasibility. Projections from the Dai-ichi Life Research Institute suggest that the cost of domestic deep-sea extraction, transportation, and refinement could reach $70,000/ton, a staggering nearly 20 times the 2013 market price of Chinese-processed rare earths ($3,600).

It is in this context that the Minamitorishima mission takes on an even more pronounced dimension. Mining the seabed is not just an engineering challenge, but a declaration of intent to structurally reduce the country's strategic vulnerability. There is one problem: Exploiting a deposit at a depth of 6,000 meters involves enormous costs and highly sophisticated technologies. And that is where the US comes in. During the US president's last visit to Tokyo, Takaichi and Donald Trump signed a cooperation agreement on rare earths and critical minerals, dubbed the Tokyo Framework. The understanding includes joint public and private investments, the creation of bilateral coordination mechanisms, and a US-Japan Rapid Response Group to monitor possible crises in supply chains. Washington will provide funding and technological support for extraction operations planned for 2026, gaining privileged access to resources in return. In a global market where cost-competitiveness underpins economic advancement, particularly the EV transition, such a price disparity renders the “miracle mud” commercially unviable without sustained and substantial state subsidies, which are unlikely to materialize. One Japanese commentator thus has drawn a sobering historical parallel to the “Battle of Imphal,” a disastrous WWII military failure characterized by logistical impossibility and a reckless disregard for material reality. The analogy suggests that Japan’s current pursuit of rare earth self-sufficiency is driven by a “national fantasy” which ignores prohibitive costs and environmental hurdles. More fundamentally, Japan has not developed the processing and refining infrastructure necessary to compete with China, which controls nearly 90% of global rare earth refining capacity.

Despite Japan’s advances in niche areas such as high-purity separation and magnet redesign, its deep-sea extraction project remains economically unviable and technologically insufficient to close the gap with China’s industrial dominance in the short term. As a result, while the Minamitorishima initiative may translate into popular support for the Takaichi administration by showcasing a fragile yet potentially promising outcome, it ultimately risks becoming a fiscal sinkhole for taxpayer money rather than fulfilling its pledge of delivering genuine self-sufficiency. Under the banner of “economic security,” projects that defy market fundamentals are increasingly manifested as political maneuvers, transforming the concept into a blank check for ventures whose economic viability remains deeply compromised. Takaichi also confirmed these commitments during her meeting with Trump at the White House and aims to further strengthen the agreement. “I hope for total US commitment,” the Japanese prime minister said in reference to the Minamitorishima rare earths cooperation, before signing a further agreement with French president Emmanuel Macron. If industrial exploitation proves to be economically and environmentally sustainable, Japan would have significant resources to ensure stable supplies and further reduce dependence on China, which is still very strong elsewhere, including Europe.

The risks of political over-promise are manifold. By implying that a domestic solution is imminent, the Japanese government creates a moral hazard for Japanese industry which is likely to discourage investment in more pragmatic, if less “patriotic,” alternatives such as expanded “urban mining,” the development of magnet technologies which might reduce or eliminate reliance on heavy rare earths, and deeper multilateral partnerships with resource-rich states such as Australia and Vietnam. At the same time, if the feasibility tests scheduled for 2027 fail to deliver on the inflated expectations cultivated by the Takaichi administration, the resulting credibility gap could weaken Japan’s bargaining position. It will not only erode domestic confidence but also create space for its competitor, China, to exploit Japan’s unfulfilled claims, thereby reinforcing its dominance in the rare earths sector. Moreover, China could leverage this asymmetry by deploying export restrictions as a strategic instrument, recalibrating Japan’s policy responses in ways that align more closely with China’s national interests, particularly given the potential effectiveness of such measures. In this sense, a strategy built on the “mirage” of 6,000-meter mud risks leaving the nation’s industrial flank exposed once the political theater subsides.